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March 3, 2010

Debate About Taliban Appeasement Is Over

Pakistan or Taliban: Whose side are you on?

The debate about Taliban appeasement is over. We have wasted too much time and energy fighting about whether or not there is a difference between Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban. We have argued with each other about whether or not we should be fighting Pakistani Taliban and working out deals with Afghani Taliban. Now we know certainly that there is no difference. Whether fighting in Afghanistan or bombing schools in Pakistan, Taliban are the same group. And this group is our enemy.

The News yesterday makes plain the reason – events over the past few days have proved for all that Taliban and Afghanistan and Pakistan are one group of militant butchers.

There are significant and far-reaching shifts in the way in which the ruling establishment perceives and interacts with the Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban. Until very recently they were seen as discrete entities, separate but having complementarities and some shared interests. Today, there is a recognition – somewhat belated but no less welcome for all of that – that both the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) are essentially one and the same; jihadi organisations which have the overthrow of the state of Pakistan as well as Afghanistan as their core objective. Over the last eight weeks we have seen nine of the eighteen key members of the Quetta Shura detained by our security forces in several parts of the country. Whilst it is not possible to second-guess what will come next, it may be reasonable to assume that other detentions will follow, and if so, this will weaken the QS and by extension the TTP – which is a very long way from the position long-held wherein a benign linkage was maintained with both groups as a hedge against the future withdrawal of coalition troops in Afghanistan.

When viewed together the TTP and the QS are a large, flexible, adaptive, resourceful and well-equipped single entity that has the capacity to inflict death and destruction to a wide range of targets. Together, they are now seen to represent an institutional threat to our country. They have the ability to terrorise and destabilise large parts of our sovereign territory, and to threaten our infant democracy. That we today recognise this is not just because the Americans have demanded it, but because we have recognised that it is no longer in our best interests to maintain this dubious dark alliance. Other regional players, closer friends than Uncle Sam, have had a role in our rethinking of the concept of strategic depth. It is alleged that the Saudis have played a part, and if true we may have much to thank them for in the future. Now is the time to move away from old and increasingly irrelevant doctrinal positions towards positions that reflect new and emerging realities. Understanding that the TTP and the QS are conjoined is a step in the right direction for both us and Afghanistan, and can only strengthen our hand in fighting militancy and terrorism.

It is no surprise that some of us have held the American with suspicion. They have not always been honest, and they have not always been looking out for anything but their own interests. Even now, America is probably looking out for its own interest, yes. But what has changed has been that this fight is in PAKISTAN’S INTEREST. This is a fight for OUR nation, a fight for OUR culture, a fight for OUR independence.

The people who are attacking and killing our innocents are foreigners from many countries including even those of our Muslim brothers in Egypt, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia. But these killers are not fighting for us, they are killing us. They are butchering our people so that they can invade our country and change our nation into a backwards country ruled by crazed butchers. We will not stand for it.

TTP and QST are two names for the same thing – enemy of Pakistan. The debate is over. Now you must decide for yourself – WHOSE SIDE ARE YOU ON???

March 2, 2010

Pakistan Military Captures Key Taliban/Al-Qaeda Complex

Pakistani military on Afghan border

The military continues to see successful operations carried out against Talibani militants, cleaning up the borders and tribal areas and ensuring the safety and security for Pakistani innocents.

The latest news comes as army captures a key Taliban and Al-Qaeda complex along the Afghan border. 75 militants were killed, including a number of foreigners from Egypt, Uzbekistan, Chechnia, and Afghanistan who had invaded Pakistan to cause murders and violence.

Dawn reports on the scene from Damadola:

(more…)

February 22, 2010

On an upward curve

The following article by Lieutenant-General (Retd) Talat Masood was originally published in The News on 22 February.

Pakistan and US FlagsThe military to military relations between the US and Pakistan seems to be gradually improving. There is a greater level of mutual confidence and less talk of ‘do more’. This has been achieved by enhanced cooperation at operational and intelligence level and is benefiting both sides. It seems sharing is taking place even at the planning stage to ensure greater synergy and to make sure that the operations undertaken by the US on the Afghan side do not have a negative fallout on Pakistan or vice-versa. The importance the US attaches to Pakistan is demonstrated by the frequency of visits by the US military leaders as well. General McChrystal, Commander of the US and ISAF forces, must have visited his counterpart no less than three to four times in one month alone. In addition, General Petraeus and Admiral Mullen, too, are keeping close contacts with General Kayani and other military and civilian leaders. This has resulted in expanded cooperation on a broad front. There is cooperation in training on new equipment and sharing of counter-insurgency doctrines and practices. Our army, although professionally capable, is constrained by the past and it is only through extensive training that we can prepare for the conflict that we are currently facing. This is even more relevant to the training of Frontier Corps whose role in counter-insurgency operations is expanding. Supply of weapons and equipment from the US has somewhat improved, but still there are shortages in critical areas like helicopters, surveillance equipment and specialised vehicles.

Similar momentum is being maintained by the US at a broader political and diplomatic level. General Jones the National Security Advisor has had meetings with the top civilian and military leaders in Pakistan to discuss Pakistan’s concerns about India’s involvement in Afghanistan and the renewal of India- Pakistan dialogue process. Ambassador Holbrooke has also made several visits and Senator John Kerry must have been to Pakistan about three times since the inception of the democratic government to see how civilian projects could be expedited.

The most pressing problem for the Americans is ensuring full cooperation for their current operations in Afghanistan. The spate of recent arrests of some top leaders of Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda including Mullah Ghani Baradar, Ameer Muawiya in Karachi and other parts of Pakistan is another strong indicator of the growing US-Pakistan cooperation. Whether this is going to be a transient phase of their relationship or a permanent inflexion in Pakistan’s policy paradigm may be early to determine. In all likelihood it appears that there is a growing realisation in Pakistan’s security establishment that the previous policy of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds may have run its course. The huge paradox of closely collaborating with the US, receiving substantial economic and military assistance from it on the one hand, and, at the same time being supportive of Afghan Taliban, is no more a viable policy. Besides, the lethal cocktail of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda and other jihadi organisations such as LeT, LeJ etc. that were erstwhile considered strategic assets are turning out to be an existential threat to the state. When viewed in this context stakes in the success of the US and ISAF in Afghanistan for Pakistan are fairly high. In the event of US failure, civil war would surely follow and it will immediately trigger off a proxy war accompanied by a humanitarian crisis of great proportions. The last thing that Pakistan would like to see is a chaotic Afghanistan, needless to mention that the success of Afghan Taliban will create a reverse ideological and strategic depth in Pakistan. We do not have to remind that Taliban’s extremist ideology would be a huge setback for our modernisation and relevance to the world. For this reason it is not surprising that arrest of such a large number of Afghan Taliban is taking place in Pakistan. This could weaken Afghan Taliban and may induce them to agree to a negotiated settlement.

It is time a serious policy reappraisal is undertaken for reasons of our internal stability as well as for benefiting from a long term strategic partnership with the US. Pakistan’s military with the consent of Afghan government could use its unique position to persuade Afghan Taliban to agree to President Karzai’s reconciliation offer. A negotiated settlement would provide the US with an exit strategy and help in stabilising Afghanistan which is crucial for Pakistan’s own fight against militants. It is likely that Mullah Baradar could become a collaborator and help in the reintegration policy of the US and the reconciliation efforts of President Karzai. Islamabad’s interests are best served if it widens its engagement and interests with other power centers in Afghanistan and not confine it to only Taliban as was the case in the past. Taliban, too, have to grasp the reality that even in the event of their military victory, a war torn Afghanistan will not have peace or economic viability without support from the international community at least in the foreseeable future.

A subtle shift in the US policy is also discernable. Instead of blaming Pakistan it has started appreciating its contribution in the fight against insurgency. The best part is that several strands of relationship between them are gradually being made to match the set of expectations. If this trend continues, current relationship which could be characterised more of a coalition can be transformed into an alliance.

It seems Washington has played a discreet role in persuading India to recommence bilateral dialogue. This, however, does not imply that the US in any way would subordinate its vital strategic partnership with India to meet Pakistan’s concerns. To expect Washington to immerse in conflict resolution will not be compatible with its larger and more immediate objective of bringing stability to Afghanistan. It will nonetheless continue to encourage both India and Pakistan to engage bilaterally to find solutions to issues.

January 18, 2010

Prospects for Partnerships and Progress

Filed under: Uncategorized — Tags: , , , , — admin @ 11:36 am

As a former Ambassador and retired Air Vice Marshal, Shahzad Chaudhry offers an important perspective on the future of the nation. Today he wrote in The Daily Times about the importance of stability and a positive relationship with the United States if Pakistan is to be treated as an equal with other elite nations.

Obviously, America and Pakistan have their own interests. But the best course of action to ensure a strong and independent Pakistan is to find where those interests converge and develop some policies that take advantage of these mutual or overlapping interests. Especially as the base of terrorist operations moves from the western border with Afghanistan to Yemen, Pakistan must take advantage of the open window of opportunity to create a space in which we are a key partner with the other elite nations.

COMMENT: Pak-US: prospects and prognosis —Shahzad Chaudhry

Let’s get the context right.

The baggage: Pakistan carries two negatives from the past at the international plane. The AQ Khan episode is difficult to explain at that level and continues to sully every sincere effort by Pakistan to play its part as a responsible nuclear-capable state. This eats at the roots of the construct that Pakistan has carefully evolved to make itself relevant in the global and regional hierarchy of nations. Competitor nations such as India play on the incredulity of Pakistan’s position on this deviation away from the formal and informal set of behavioural and conformance standards that are used so often to validate a nation’s power base and its contextual relevance.

The second negative is arguably the use of non-state elements as a proxy capability to force a change in the context of intractable regional issues; on such issues we may be morally and politically correct, but the manner of their emphasis and the use of proxy ploys to achieve our aims falls far short of both moral and legal credibility. Pakistan must therefore carry the disadvantage of being judged in the light of such historical experience and any argument in support of such issues of importance stands significantly compromised.

The US on the other hand also has a compromised past, particularly in popular perception; on two occasions that mark major turning points in the Pak-US historical context, the US decided to leave Pakistan to its own fate after having squeezed the most out of Pakistan in support of American interests that did not sustain but were time-restricted in terms of their significance even to the US. Though declared an ally of the US in the Cold War days, rather than assist Pakistan in its first full-blown war with India in 1965, the US imposed military and economic sanctions and pushed Pakistan into precarious economic consequences. That then became, from amongst various other factors, the underlying reason for the vastly perceived inequitable resource allocation between West and East Pakistan, alienating the Bengalis of East Pakistan and causing the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971.

In the second instance, the US connected back to Pakistan in 1979 when Pakistan again became a conduit for American efforts to dislodge the Soviets in Afghanistan. The resulting eviction of the Soviets brought the curtain down on the Soviet Union as an entity, tore the Berlin Wall down, unified Germany, thus strengthening the West’s political perch against a truncated Russia, and spelled the end of the Cold War. What Pakistan got in return for this favour was both the baby and the bathtub: the mujahideen that Pakistan helped create and employ to defeat the Soviets and the state of Pakistan were left high and dry, each to their own fate. Both Pakistan and the US today rue the consequences of an ill-thought abdication of responsibility to bottle the genie of the Afghan jihad and are inextricably embroiled in facing the unintended consequences of the failure to clear up the mess before quitting.

The context: the US again needed a referral back to Pakistan after 9/11. Osama and his lieutenants, looking for a new mission after the Afghan jihad, found one in the Middle East and the US-Israeli nexus. Gradually, and with time, the mission has morphed into a transnational agenda to fight US imperialism against the perceived wrongs meted out to most Muslim nations. A response to 9/11 and the pursuit of al Qaeda may have brought the Americans into the region once again, but an added concern now is the security of Pakistani nuclear assets and a pervasive apprehension within the American strategic community of such a capability falling into the hands of al Qaeda. As such, Pakistan’s nuclear capability becomes an implicit mission. When, and if, the mission against al Qaeda is over, or declared over, Pakistan’s nuclear capability will become US mission number one; which of the two, or both, might continue to interest the Americans in the main will determine the extent of the US’s proclaimed long-term involvement with Pakistan. Altruistically, the US’s claim for a preference for a strategic relationship rather than a transactional relationship, as has been the case hitherto, seems again conditional to the US seeing fruitful returns in both cases. What is close-ended and a definable objective cannot render itself into a strategic context that may run the course of time. Alternately, a continued interest is possible if a productive engagement becomes the sustaining compulsion to the end of achieving a salubrious objective.

When Musharraf acceded to the American challenge to side with them, he had two specific objectives in mind: one, to somehow use American influence while they happen to be in the region to trigger a resolution of the age-old Kashmir problem with a recalcitrant India; and two, to secure Pakistan’s nuclear assets against any inimical design to force Pakistan to give up the capability. Siding with the US in their latest war, particularly when they were so heavily dependent on Pakistan for its successful prosecution and for logistical and supportive operations, was likely to cast the dice in Pakistan’s favour to retain the capability.

But has it? That shall remain the popular refrain for quite some time.

The prognosis: The war against al Qaeda has practically already shifted out to Yemen. There are only a few remnant interests for the US now in this region as far as the war on terror goes: seek some stability for Afghanistan for a ruse to exit gracefully out of there; hunt Osama and any of his deputies if they still happen to be in the region; through application of force denude and diminish Taliban capability to re-appropriate power for the more secular leadership currently in place, denying them the ability to provide yet again a ready haven to al Qaeda if they need one.

The US will likely remain the dominant power in the world till the mid-century — that is another 40 years; American leadership in technology, innovation and systematisation of newer capacities will add to its continued domination in the global order. China will be a close number two when all is added up to index national power potential. China’s consumerism will follow the patterns of the US with growing purchasing capacity of its large mass of population gobbling up the manufacturing advantage that gives China the boost in current climes. The US will therefore remain important to the world; Pakistan will need to keep on the Americans’ right side; its relations with China will only, at the cost of great foolishness, assume any exclusive colour. The correction in our national discourse needs to be factored in right away.

American interest will lie in Pakistan following a steady course in its national journey. As long as the nukes are safe and the country remains above chaos, chances are a lot of American fears can be appeased. It will equally be in Pakistan’s interest to retain a secure and assured nuclear capability to grant the nation an unreserved opportunity to pursue prosperity while remaining assured of a strategic equilibrium endowing long-term peace to the region — the enduring dividend ever since India and Pakistan embraced nuclear status.

A single point of convergence should be attainable if Pakistan will ensure and possess the type of internal and external stability that can measurably add to regional and global sense of growth, prosperity and peace. Making Pakistan relevant to the international order, and in more positive ways than what is currently the case, shall enable its rightful place in the global hierarchical order. Pakistan could then deservedly stake its claim for seeking the kind of parity that is granted to the other members of the nuclear club. In short, a country at peace with itself and with others, on the march to economic stability and progress in all areas of socio-political domains will reassure the world of its capacity to retain, secure and responsibly sustain its position as a member of the elite club. This shall, in all probability, define the future of the Pak-US relationship. Inherent therein also is Pakistan’s most imperative challenge.

January 6, 2010

Pakistan, US Join Forces Against Taliban Threat

US Gen. Stanley McChrystal with Army Chief Gen. Kayani

US Gen. Stanley McChrystal with Army Chief Gen. Kayani

American General Stanley McChrystal was full of praise for Gen. Kayani and the Pakistani military when he spoke to reporters at the residence of the US Ambassador on Monday. Additionally, the US General said about the fight against Taliban that the Americans will be working jointly with Pakistan’s military to defeat the militants attacking Pakistan.

The Daily Times is encouraged by these developments as well as the changes to policy being made by American President Barack Obama. Still, though, the editors have some important suggestions for the Americans. Namely, they need to continue doing more to build trust among the people and show that they are not going to abandon them. Also they have some advice for those government officials who may try to use Taliban as an asset and part of its ‘strategic depth’ policy – this is undermining the Army’s efforts to stop the violent attacks.

Joint Pak-US action against Taliban in the offing

Pakistan and the United States are working on a plan to take joint military action against Taliban and launch coordinated attacks on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, according to Gen Stanley McChrystal, Commander of the Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) in Afghanistan.

He was talking to reporters at the residence of the US ambassador on Monday evening after holding talks with military commanders here and visiting Swat.

“In fact, we are developing a joint campaign plan so that we approach the entire problem together and as much as possible we can make our efforts synergistic.”

Gen McChrystal said strong partnership between the US and Pakistan was critical for counter-insurgency operations on both sides of the border.

“The most important thing we can do is to coordinate our operations with the Pakistan Army and then there is, of course, going to be political coordination.”

In contrast to some other US officials, who have been lecturing Pakistanis on the need to ‘do more’ in the fight against extremist elements, Gen McChrystal repeatedly called for ‘partnership’ between the two countries and said that differences should not detract them from their aims.

Referring to the often-discussed trust deficit between the two countries, he said the level of mistrust had declined but it needed to be narrowed.

Surprisingly, Gen McChrystal, did not broach either the Haqqani Network or the Quetta Shura – the two problems that have posed serious challenges to cooperation between the two countries.

Pakistan Army, which is engaged in a campaign against militant groups operating from its soil, has been accused of ignoring Afghanistan-focussed groups, prompting critics to claim that Islamabad being fearful of growing Indian influence in the war-torn country, was trying to preserve these factions as future assets for keeping its influence in Afghanistan.

Gen McChrystal, who was all praise for the military’s counter-insurgency campaign and the leadership of Army Chief Gen Kayani, said he had no reasons to doubt Pakistan Army’s sincerity.

“I’m hopeful of the time when the Haqqani Network, which is causing damage inside Afghanistan, is taken on by both of us jointly to reduce the damage they are causing. It is important that we together do that.”

About the Quetta Shura, he said that the best course was cooperation with Pakistan military. He opposed any direct action against the Shura.

“Taliban that threaten Afghanistan need to be pressured everywhere … Partnership with Pakistan is the best road to that as we strengthen the strategic partnership … that is the best way I think.”

He said that successes against Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan were interlinked and could not be achieved in isolation. “If Afghanistan suffers from instability it is going to be contagious.

“Everybody has a stake in coming out well.” On the issue of India using Afghanistan to destabilise Pakistan, he said, the complaints needed to be addressed. Although he said he did not have enough information to confirm or deny the allegations.

“If perceptions drive people to mistrust then there is a need to work on them.”

Shrinking trust deficit

Afghan Coalition Commander General Stanley McChrystal has said that the trust deficit between the US and Pakistan is shrinking, but things could get better. He said that enhanced cooperation in the war on terror between the two countries as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan could help bridge the trust deficit. McChrystal refuted the notion that there were any differences with Pakistan over the US troop surge in Afghanistan. Bridging the trust deficit between the two allies in the war on terror is critical if the Taliban and al Qaeda are to be eliminated. The terror threat cannot be eliminated until and unless the Pakistani establishment revisits its stance of deliberately or through neglect letting the Afghan Taliban operate from Pakistani soil. Though the Pakistan Army has launched a successful military offensive against the local Taliban, it may still consider the Afghan Taliban an asset and part of its ‘strategic depth’ policy. This has worsened the situation for Afghanistan and the foreign troops there. The military operations have undoubtedly put pressure on the border, which is why some of the key al Qaeda operatives have been forced to flee the area and take refuge in Yemen and elsewhere. This poses a threat to worldwide peace.

That said, it is also important to take a closer look at the US strategy in Afghanistan. President Obama may have adopted a different policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan but it has yet to prove itself in the field. Success in Afghanistan cannot be achieved until and unless some lacunae are addressed properly. The Bush administration’s military strategy was to seek out the enemy, which created some problems as the enemy was not only inherently elusive but could also melt into the local population with ease. This led to collateral damage and increased the anti-US sentiment in Afghanistan. Despite the troop surge, the Obama administration’s policy is more focused on protection of the Afghan people and development of the war-torn country. While this is a positive policy shift, President Obama must realise that such a one-sided strategy cannot be successful since it may end up abandoning large tracts of the uninhabited countryside to the Taliban. Winning the hearts and the minds of the Afghan people will not lead to a complete annihilation of the Taliban. For that, the US needs more boots on the ground. The US also needs a credible partner in Afghanistan on the political front. Karzai’s fraudulent elections have made him lose whatever credibility he had left. This in turn puts the Americans in a difficult situation. No amount of troop surge or new policies can succeed until and unless the government in Afghanistan is acceptable to the local people. The prospects of success in Afghanistan seem bleak for the moment.

December 24, 2009

Adm. Mullen: Pakistani Military Achievements 'Remarkable'

Filed under: Uncategorized — Tags: , , , , , , — admin @ 7:26 am

 

Gen. Kayani and American Adm. Mullen

Gen. Kayani and American Adm. Mullen

The American military chief has continued his praise for Paksitan’s military this week, saying that our military’s achievements were ‘remarkable’ and that our military does not get enough praise for the hard work and successes that we have accomplished.

Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen has said that Pakistan does not get enough credit for its role in the war against extremists although some of its achievements were ‘pretty extraordinary’.

The American military chief also had words for those who criticise Pakistan’s fight against militants, perhaps sending a reminder to those who are prone to say that we should ‘do more’ that what we are doing is quite extraordinary already.

‘Too many people eagerly and easily criticise Pakistan for what they haven’t done, and when I go to Swat and look at what they did there on the military side I think it’s pretty extraordinary,’ said the US military chief while talking to journalists on Sunday.

A report released on Monday by the American Forces Press Service, noted that last week Pakistani authorities arranged for Admiral Mullen to visit Swat and showed him the areas they had retaken from the Taliban.

‘Swat was in danger, and the Taliban began moving even closer to the Pakistani capital. Admiral Mullen’s visit there showed that the Pakistani military has done a good job of counter-insurgency. The army cleared the valley and is holding it,’ the report noted.

It quoted Admiral Mullen as saying that while Pakistan’s job in Swat was not complete yet, what Pakistanis had achieved so far was remarkable.

The report in Dawn went on to describe the friendly relationship between the American military command and Pakistan’s military. This is above all a natural result of the partnership and close ties that our military has enjoyed with the Americans, as well as the current security situation in which we are fighting a common enemy that is the jihadi militants.

The report noted that more than most US officials, Admiral Mullen had a cordial and long-standing relationship with the Pakistani military.

The report pointed out that Admiral Mullen ‘advises patience and humility’ in dealing with Pakistan, a view not shared by some leading Republicans in Congress.

Separately, the Pentagon reported that Admiral Mullen signed guidelines for the US military for 2010, which goes to members of the Joint Staff and informs the joint force.

Al-Qaeda and similar terrorist groups remained the biggest threat to the United States, the admiral wrote in the guidance. ‘The threat is still real,’ he said. Defeating those groups will take more than military power, and the admiral called on the US military to work with other national agencies and international allies to take on the threat.

President Obama’s strategy has the goal of defeating Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and to prevent the group from threatening America and its allies, he noted.

‘Our main effort now must be to push forces into the theatre as quickly as possible – including shifting the balance of enablers from Iraq,’ the admiral wrote. The enablers include such things as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, engineers, military police and civil affairs personnel.

All aspects of the joint force needed to act more quickly, he said, urging the Defence Department and the combatant commands to send their very best people to fight the wars.

December 23, 2009

Anti-Americanism and the Future of Pakistan

Hypernationalist anti-Americanism is a dangerous path for the nation's future.

Hypernationalist anti-Americanism is a dangerous path for the nation's future.

Anti-Americanism has become quite the trend in much of the country, and this does not hold well for the future. A writer on this blog wrote last week that there were uncomfortable similarities with the political situation in Iran thirty years ago – a reaction against American involvement in the country that popularized a faux-nationalism hijacked by theocratic militants. Renowned defense analyst Ahmad Faruqui notices this as well in his column, Monday’s issue of Dawn, and notes that the conspiracies and anti-Americanism that is being stoked by hypernationalists is not in Pakistan’s interests.

Lost on the anti-Americanistas was the fact that the US was not obliged to provide $7.5bn over the next five years to Pakistan. If the Pakistanis did not like the conditions that came with the funds, they could simply decline the aid. As Senator Kerry put it, the US had plenty of other places on which to spend the money.

When it comes to anti-Americanism, there is little doubt that Al Qaeda and the Taliban lead the pack. But the rightwing parties are not too far behind. At a recent demonstration in Pakistan, bearded men held up placards that flaunted the Yankees in no uncertain terms: ‘Crush, Crush, America.’

But we must ask if this rabid anti-Americanism being promoted by hypernationalists is based in facts. It is easy to come up with wild conspiracy theories, but what happens if you put those same theories to a historical test? Faruqui does just that, and finds some real problems with the theories:

Anti-Americanism has also picked up converts in the mainstream print and electronic media. Conspiracy theories involving America are aired with increasing frequency. Even some leading figures from the diplomatic establishment have joined the fray.

The latest is Shamshad Ahmad, a former foreign secretary and former UN ambassador.

Speaking at a seminar in Karachi on state sovereignty, he went beyond the usual recital of grievances. That well-known list includes three major items. First, the US did not come to Pakistan’s aid during the 1965 war with India. This overlooks the fact that the war was initiated by Pakistan and that US arms were never meant to be used against India.

Second, it did not come to Pakistan’s aid in the 1971 war with India. This overlooks the fact that the war was triggered by the military’s ambitions to negate the results of the general elections and to rule in perpetuity.

Third, it abandoned Pakistan once the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989. This overlooks the fact that the US had not guaranteed Pakistan’s security for all times to come against enemies of all stripes.

The former foreign secretary, a strong proponent of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons but by no means a firebrand Islamist, stated: ‘The US had used us as a spy in the past to fulfil its motives, while now it is using us as a mercenary.’ And then came the clincher: ‘It is the US intervention, not the Russian intervention which has kept everything on the boil in the region.’

Some political analysts continue to indulge in conspiracy theories about the attack on Pearl Harbour on Dec 7, 1941 and the attacks of Sept 11, 2001. But Ahmad put himself in a class of one by saying that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve in 1979 was engineered by the US.

He said, ‘The Americans think and plan about things they want to achieve in 50 or 60 years. They created a vacuum in Afghanistan. So after the political manoeuvring in Afghanistan, the US created a way for the Soviet Union [to be] sucked in[to] that vacuum.’

The former senior diplomat, who knows the country’s history better than most, went on to say that the Americans got the Pakistanis on their side by saying that the Soviets were out to fulfil the czarist dream of building a warm water port. This is revisionist history. Right after the Soviet invasion, Gen Ziaul Haq put in a plea for the West’s help, saying that the Evil Empire was about to make a run for Gwadar. He famously rejected President Jimmy Carter’s $400m aid package by calling it peanuts. But when President Ronald Reagan offered him a $3.2bn package, he was all smiles.

These are the historical inaccuracies of a former foreign secretary. Someone who should know better. But the fantasies that are flying around discussion boards and drawing rooms across the country are even more outrageous.

An ultranationalist theory that is rapidly gaining currency in Pakistan is that there was peace in the region until the US arrived in October 2001. Several of the ultranationalists also subscribe to four ‘booster’ theories. Namely, that all of our problems are a result of the Americans.

First, that the US engineered the 9/11 attacks on itself. It needed an excuse to invade Afghanistan and control access to Central Asian natural gas. Second, that Osama bin Laden did not carry out the 9/11 attacks, that he is an American agent trained and armed by the CIA and that he was killed in December 2001. Third, that Al Qaeda does not exist. And fourth, that the Taliban are simply freedom-loving people trying to free their country from foreign occupation. The obvious theory about 9/11 has no vocal adherents in Pakistan. This argues that the attacks were carried out to draw the US into the region, inflame interfaith relations and provoke a holy war that would result in the revival of the caliphate.

This sort of thinking not only ignores the past, but imperils our future. Recall the words of Lt. Gen (retd) Talat Masood and his explanation of why anti-Americanism is a danger to our national defense. Faruqui picks up this same theme in his closing arguments for his column in Dawn:

With every passing week, Pakistan continues to inch towards the brink. Given the frequency of the Muslim-on-Muslim attacks that are now being mounted, it is moot whether Pakistan is a failing state or a failed state. Neither prognosis is good.

The US is not perfect. It has made its share of mistakes, domestically and internationally. A common charge levied by the anti-Americanistas is that the US acts in its own interests. That should be cause for celebration and not denigration. If only Pakistan would do the same. Instead of demonising America, it should turn on its own demons.

This rabid anti-Americanism is a danger to the future of Pakistan. The Iranians also thought that following the words of hypernationalist theocrats would save their nation. Instead, it set them back decades, and still today they are struggling to remove the suffocating regime. Once the militants take control, there is no more confusion about who is the real enemy of the people.

The Americans have made many mistakes, but they have also stood by Pakistan in the past. Today, they appear to be making real attempts at building a partnership with us. To suggest that we turn our backs on them and join hands with the hypernationalists is suicide. After all, there can be no argument that it was Americans who beat to death protestors of the Iranian regime. Inshallah we will not find ourselves in a similar future.

December 16, 2009

The End of Jihadi Proxies

Filed under: Defense — Tags: , , , , , , — admin @ 12:36 pm

Dr Manzur Ejaz writes in today’s Daily Times that the time has come to end the use of jihadi proxies in the struggle for national security.

Pakistan and the US have put themselves in such a tight corner that both countries are not left with many choices. President Barack Obama made winning the Afghan war his priority even during his election campaign. Furthermore, his expected increase of troops in Afghanistan has put his credibility on line where he has to show, at least, as much success as George Bush achieved in the most unpopular Iraq war. On the other hand, the Pakistan military does not seem ready to go all the way against all kinds of jihadis because of its apprehensions, real or perceived, about India.

President Obama and most of the US policy circles are convinced that it is not only the Taliban of the tribal areas but all kinds of jihadis that are potential threats for the overall American interests in the area. For starters, improving Pak-Indian relations, a key component of US policy for South Asia, correlates directly to the elimination of anti-India jihadis is pertinent. In addition, the US cannot run different systems and departments without Indian help: practically, the Indians are managing everything from mail to communication systems in Afghanistan. A stable democratic system in Pakistan, taken to be part of the US strategy, is considered impossible if Islamisation is not reversed.

To achieve these goals, President Obama has taken a risk to alienate the Democrats and other important segments of his constituency by increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan. He won a vote in the Senate on increasing the troops because of the overwhelming Republican support: it seemed like a Republican rather than a left-liberal agenda that seated him in the White House.

President Obama and independent analysts know fully well that the US casualties are going to increase by increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan. It is anticipated that Pakistan is going to be blamed for increasing casualties. Therefore, President Obama will come under extreme pressure to take some kind of action against Pakistan or at least send troops to Pakistan’s tribal areas.

There is a section of historians and war analysts who believe that the Soviet Union made a big mistake by not going into the tribal belt. They believe that if the Soviets had made the tribal belt as part of the war theatre they may have avoided a humiliating retreat. Therefore, the US should not repeat the mistake and take direct action in Pakistan’s tribal belt if the Pakistan Army does not do its part. Probably, the US has communicated its intentions to Pakistan through its military leaders.

The Obama administration is also apprehensive about Pakistani military’s political ambitions. The feeling is that the military keeps calling the shots while it should be fully under civilian control. Unlike the Cold War era, the US did not get desired cooperation from Pakistan military in Afghanistan. Despite tall claims, extremism and Talibanisation kept on expanding during the Musharraf era. The trend was reversed only when the civilian government was installed in Islamabad. Therefore, for the first time, the US recognised that its interests are better served during civilian rule in Pakistan. The Kerry-Lugar Bill was recognition of this new approach that was resented by the Pakistan military, its supporters and proxies.

Pakistan’s military is apprehensive about the US-Indian nexus and American pressure to surrender its traditional supremacy over the civilian government. The military is obsessed that India poses a threat to country’s security and therefore, the proxy fighters, i.e. certain kind of jihadi groups, have to be supported. This is where the core of the Pak-US conflict lies and cannot be easily resolved.

The military is also accused of picking and choosing between good and bad Taliban in the tribal belt. The drone attacks and threat to send forces in Pakistan’s tribal areas are triggered by such a US perception. Pakistan military denies these allegations and claims that it is doing its utmost to eliminate jihadis. These ongoing conflicting perceptions are complicating the situation, to say the least.

However, it is clear that the US, run by President Obama or someone else, can hardly run away from Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, China and Russia cannot afford a Taliban-run Afghanistan either. Therefore, all the international powers, actively fighting or by-standing, are united against the Taliban rule. Therefore, Pakistan’s military cannot sustain its jihadi proxies by any means and should adopt alternative approaches by strengthening economy and democratic rule in the country.

December 15, 2009

US-Pakistan Partnership Vital to Pakistan Security

US Gen. David Petraus and Pakistan Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani Meet

US Gen. David Petraus and Pakistan Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani Meet

US. Gen David Petraus met with Army Chief Gen. Kayani yesterday and discussed the current security crisis, and two important points of information came out of the meetings: First, the military is committed to supporting the civilian government. Second, a long-term US-Pakistan partnership is vital to Pakistan’s national security.

On the first point, an article in Dawn today quotes the American General saying he discussed the possibility of a coup with Gen. Kayani and was told that the military has no plans for a coup and is committed to supporting the democratically-elected civilian government.

In a briefing with Pakistani journalists during a visit to Islamabad, Petraeus said Pakistan’s military had told him it was not interested in destabilizing the elected civilian government.

‘I have seen no indication that (army chief) General Ashfaq Kayani is entertaining such a notion,’ local newspapers on Tuesday quoted Petraeus as telling reporters at the US ambassador’s residence when asked about his meeting with Kayani.

‘Whenever we have talked to them they say they are committed to democratically elected civilian government.’

This should put to rest predictions such as those made by Shaheen Sehbai in yesterday’s The News that the US “has almost categorically declared that they are no longer interested in saving President Asif Ali Zardari if he falls in his current battle for survival.”

The second point was described in The New York Times yesterday in an article about the meeting between the American and Pakistani Generals. This article details discussions between the two military leaders about cooperation in the fight against Taliban and jihadis in both Afghanistan and Pakistan both.

The article notes that the Pakistani military has been trying to make a delicate balance as it relates to Siraj Haqqani. The difficulty in attacking the Haqqani network of jihadis comes from a skepticism about the American dedication to the region. After all is said and done, if the Americans abandon the region, Pakistan must choose the best course of action to secure its border with Afghanistan and build its strength and influence in the region.

The core reason for Pakistan’s imperviousness is its scant faith in the Obama troop surge, and what Pakistan sees as the need to position itself for a regional realignment in Afghanistan once American forces begin to leave.

It considers Mr. Haqqani and his control of large areas of Afghan territory vital to Pakistan in the jostling for influence that will pit Pakistan, India, Russia, China and Iran against one another in the post-American Afghan arena, the Pakistani officials said.

Pakistan is particularly eager to counter the growing influence of its archenemy, India, which is pouring $1.2 billion in aid into Afghanistan. “If America walks away, Pakistan is very worried that it will have India on its eastern border and India on its western border in Afghanistan,” said Tariq Fatemi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States who is pro-American in his views.

For that reason, Mr. Fatemi said, the Pakistani Army is “very reluctant” to jettison Mr. Haqqani, Pakistan’s strong card in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Pakistanis do not want to alienate Mr. Haqqani because they consider him an important player in reconciliation efforts that they would like to see get under way in Afghanistan immediately, the officials said.

Because Mr. Haqqani shelters Qaeda leaders and operatives in North Waziristan, Washington is opposed to including Mr. Haqqani among the possible reconcilable Taliban, at least for the moment, a Western diplomat said.

But this is a dangerous game of strategy that has already resulted in the current security crisis. For decades, the military used jihadis as a force of defense against Indian meddling in Kashmir and Afghanistan and it has allowed the build up of those groups to become a real threat to Pakistan.

Pakistan currently has its hands full fighting the Pakistani Taliban in South Waziristan and other places, and it is beyond its capacity to open another front against the Afghan Taliban, the officials said of General Kayani’s response. The offensive has had the secondary effect of constraining the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and driving some of its commanders and fighters across the border to Afghanistan, senior American military officials in Afghanistan said.

But implicit in General Kayani’s reply was the fact that the homegrown Pakistani Taliban represent the real threat to Pakistan. General Kayani argued that they are the ones carrying out attacks against security installations and civilian markets in Pakistan’s cities and must be the army’s top priority, the officials said.

Pakistan has its own problems to deal with in the TTP and LeT groups that are now daily committing bombings and attacks inside Pakistan. As the Haqqani network is primarily operating in Pakistan which should give the Americans the opportunity to eliminate him themselves. This is the position of Pakistani security officials.

But making a separate peace with Haqqani is not a sustainable strategy, and risks increased and prolonged attacks inside Paksitan.

For his part, Mr. Haqqani fights in Afghanistan, and is considered more of an asset than a threat by the Pakistanis. But he is the most potent force fighting the United States, American and Pakistani officials agree.

He has subcommanders threaded throughout eastern and southern Afghanistan. His fighters control Paktika, Paktia and Khost Provinces in Afghanistan, which lie close to North Waziristan. His men are also strong in Ghazni, Logar and Wardak Provinces, the officials said.

Looking back, it was a mistaken strategy by both the Americans and our own military to make deals with jihadis to be security assets. Whether the countries were using the mujahedeen to fight against the Soviets or the Indians, once those battles were finished, it was impossible to put the monster back in its cage.

How the Taliban repays deals. Destoryed school in Pakistan.

How the Taliban repays deals. Destoryed school in Pakistan.

This time, we must not repeat past mistakes. While making deals with the likes of Siraj Haqqani or TTP or any other jihadi network will only bring possible short-term gains, those deals will surely result in long term setbacks. The best strategy for maintaining Pakistan’s security long-term is to build the trust with the Americans so that Gen. Petraeus does not abandon us. Already there are good signs that he will not leave us.

But also we should work together to root out the jihadi forces so that they can be defeated once and for all, leaving Pakistan stronger and more influential in the region. Partnering with jihadis will not provide this strength. Only partnering with Gen. Petraeus will.

December 12, 2009

Time To Show Some Initiative

Filed under: Afghanistan,Defense — Tags: , , — admin @ 5:51 am

Very interesting column by Mr. Cyril Almeida in the Dawn yesterday. In his column he says that military needs to take some initiative in Afghanistan. This is not that ridiculous statement by Mr. Gordon Brown to ‘do more.’ Rather, Mr. Almeida makes very clear that for the mission in Afghanistan to succeed and our borders to be protected, our military should take charge and start showing the decisive skills and strategies that have made Pakistan strong despite being poor compared to other powers like USA and Britain.

Why can’t we show some initiative instead? Why not call for a ministerial summit in Islamabad of the six-plus-two group? Hey, guys, here’s what we think and here’s a road map that we can lead on. And if the military guys don’t trust the civilians here, why not drop the cloak-and-dagger stuff and all those ‘secret’ meetings with top American officials?

Call all the big military players over to GHQ for a meeting and hold a press conference later — see, we aren’t as diabolical or stubborn as the world thinks, we’ve got ideas and we’re willing to listen and engage.

Again, I get it. All that the security establishment sees and talks about isn’t made up; there are many real threats, few obvious opportunities and little room to manoeuvre in the regional context. But if we want to play with the big boys, we need to realise that the carrots can’t all be theirs and the sticks ours.

For sure, the big boys have to take us seriously because of our political and military position in the region. But they will never want to take us seriously if all we do is curl up sullenly in the foetal position and lash out at others until we get our way in ‘our’ Afghanistan.

Pakistan is the key to peace and stability. It is only with our military strength and strategy that we will be secure. The Americans have great resources and are a key ally for us, but despite all their technology and resources, they are like blind men in the desert without the cooperation of Pakistan.  We are like men who can see, but have no rice and no water. To successfully navigate the security crisis, we must work together as a team. But this means that Pakistan must show some initiative and take the leadership position that we should have.

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