Obviously, America and Pakistan have their own interests. But the best course of action to ensure a strong and independent Pakistan is to find where those interests converge and develop some policies that take advantage of these mutual or overlapping interests. Especially as the base of terrorist operations moves from the western border with Afghanistan to Yemen, Pakistan must take advantage of the open window of opportunity to create a space in which we are a key partner with the other elite nations.
COMMENT: Pak-US: prospects and prognosis —Shahzad Chaudhry
Let’s get the context right.
The baggage: Pakistan carries two negatives from the past at the international plane. The AQ Khan episode is difficult to explain at that level and continues to sully every sincere effort by Pakistan to play its part as a responsible nuclear-capable state. This eats at the roots of the construct that Pakistan has carefully evolved to make itself relevant in the global and regional hierarchy of nations. Competitor nations such as India play on the incredulity of Pakistan’s position on this deviation away from the formal and informal set of behavioural and conformance standards that are used so often to validate a nation’s power base and its contextual relevance.
The second negative is arguably the use of non-state elements as a proxy capability to force a change in the context of intractable regional issues; on such issues we may be morally and politically correct, but the manner of their emphasis and the use of proxy ploys to achieve our aims falls far short of both moral and legal credibility. Pakistan must therefore carry the disadvantage of being judged in the light of such historical experience and any argument in support of such issues of importance stands significantly compromised.
The US on the other hand also has a compromised past, particularly in popular perception; on two occasions that mark major turning points in the Pak-US historical context, the US decided to leave Pakistan to its own fate after having squeezed the most out of Pakistan in support of American interests that did not sustain but were time-restricted in terms of their significance even to the US. Though declared an ally of the US in the Cold War days, rather than assist Pakistan in its first full-blown war with India in 1965, the US imposed military and economic sanctions and pushed Pakistan into precarious economic consequences. That then became, from amongst various other factors, the underlying reason for the vastly perceived inequitable resource allocation between West and East Pakistan, alienating the Bengalis of East Pakistan and causing the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971.
In the second instance, the US connected back to Pakistan in 1979 when Pakistan again became a conduit for American efforts to dislodge the Soviets in Afghanistan. The resulting eviction of the Soviets brought the curtain down on the Soviet Union as an entity, tore the Berlin Wall down, unified Germany, thus strengthening the West’s political perch against a truncated Russia, and spelled the end of the Cold War. What Pakistan got in return for this favour was both the baby and the bathtub: the mujahideen that Pakistan helped create and employ to defeat the Soviets and the state of Pakistan were left high and dry, each to their own fate. Both Pakistan and the US today rue the consequences of an ill-thought abdication of responsibility to bottle the genie of the Afghan jihad and are inextricably embroiled in facing the unintended consequences of the failure to clear up the mess before quitting.
The context: the US again needed a referral back to Pakistan after 9/11. Osama and his lieutenants, looking for a new mission after the Afghan jihad, found one in the Middle East and the US-Israeli nexus. Gradually, and with time, the mission has morphed into a transnational agenda to fight US imperialism against the perceived wrongs meted out to most Muslim nations. A response to 9/11 and the pursuit of al Qaeda may have brought the Americans into the region once again, but an added concern now is the security of Pakistani nuclear assets and a pervasive apprehension within the American strategic community of such a capability falling into the hands of al Qaeda. As such, Pakistan’s nuclear capability becomes an implicit mission. When, and if, the mission against al Qaeda is over, or declared over, Pakistan’s nuclear capability will become US mission number one; which of the two, or both, might continue to interest the Americans in the main will determine the extent of the US’s proclaimed long-term involvement with Pakistan. Altruistically, the US’s claim for a preference for a strategic relationship rather than a transactional relationship, as has been the case hitherto, seems again conditional to the US seeing fruitful returns in both cases. What is close-ended and a definable objective cannot render itself into a strategic context that may run the course of time. Alternately, a continued interest is possible if a productive engagement becomes the sustaining compulsion to the end of achieving a salubrious objective.
When Musharraf acceded to the American challenge to side with them, he had two specific objectives in mind: one, to somehow use American influence while they happen to be in the region to trigger a resolution of the age-old Kashmir problem with a recalcitrant India; and two, to secure Pakistan’s nuclear assets against any inimical design to force Pakistan to give up the capability. Siding with the US in their latest war, particularly when they were so heavily dependent on Pakistan for its successful prosecution and for logistical and supportive operations, was likely to cast the dice in Pakistan’s favour to retain the capability.
But has it? That shall remain the popular refrain for quite some time.
The prognosis: The war against al Qaeda has practically already shifted out to Yemen. There are only a few remnant interests for the US now in this region as far as the war on terror goes: seek some stability for Afghanistan for a ruse to exit gracefully out of there; hunt Osama and any of his deputies if they still happen to be in the region; through application of force denude and diminish Taliban capability to re-appropriate power for the more secular leadership currently in place, denying them the ability to provide yet again a ready haven to al Qaeda if they need one.
The US will likely remain the dominant power in the world till the mid-century — that is another 40 years; American leadership in technology, innovation and systematisation of newer capacities will add to its continued domination in the global order. China will be a close number two when all is added up to index national power potential. China’s consumerism will follow the patterns of the US with growing purchasing capacity of its large mass of population gobbling up the manufacturing advantage that gives China the boost in current climes. The US will therefore remain important to the world; Pakistan will need to keep on the Americans’ right side; its relations with China will only, at the cost of great foolishness, assume any exclusive colour. The correction in our national discourse needs to be factored in right away.
American interest will lie in Pakistan following a steady course in its national journey. As long as the nukes are safe and the country remains above chaos, chances are a lot of American fears can be appeased. It will equally be in Pakistan’s interest to retain a secure and assured nuclear capability to grant the nation an unreserved opportunity to pursue prosperity while remaining assured of a strategic equilibrium endowing long-term peace to the region — the enduring dividend ever since India and Pakistan embraced nuclear status.
A single point of convergence should be attainable if Pakistan will ensure and possess the type of internal and external stability that can measurably add to regional and global sense of growth, prosperity and peace. Making Pakistan relevant to the international order, and in more positive ways than what is currently the case, shall enable its rightful place in the global hierarchical order. Pakistan could then deservedly stake its claim for seeking the kind of parity that is granted to the other members of the nuclear club. In short, a country at peace with itself and with others, on the march to economic stability and progress in all areas of socio-political domains will reassure the world of its capacity to retain, secure and responsibly sustain its position as a member of the elite club. This shall, in all probability, define the future of the Pak-US relationship. Inherent therein also is Pakistan’s most imperative challenge.
Taliban militants are no match for Pakistan’s security forces was proven again this weekend when 